Libertarian ‘entitlement theory’, which comprises three principles of justice. The first concerns initial acquisition, or how one becomes entitled to previously unowned things. Then comes the principle of transfer, specifying how titles may pass from one person to another. The idea is that repeated application of these two principles will yield a distribution in which everyone is entitled to their holdings. Lastly, a principle of rectification governs the treatment of injustice, that is, violations of the first two principles.
Note that whereas utilitarian justice aims at a particular ‘end-state’ without regard for how it got there, libertarianism is concerned exclusively with the operation of just procedures, without regard for what ‘pattern’ of distribution results from them.
Nozick puts it: “Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just”.
The correlative then must be: “Whatever arises from a unjust situation by unjust steps is itself unjust”.
Discussing the transfer of property rights begs the question of how one could acquire title over unowned resources in the first place. Consistency should commit the libertarian to denouncing unilateral appropriation of common resources as a form of theft, since it peremptorily deprives others of their liberty to use the appropriated resources.
Autonomy recommends that individuals “have a veto over appropriations which exclude [them] from the commons.” But Nozick denies this, claiming that “ the crucial point is whether appropriation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others.” This seems inconsistent with the core libertarian value of autonomy, but we might charitably interpret it as appealing to a general principle of ‘natural liberty’, whereby an action is permissible if it does not harm others.
This raises two issues: what sort of harm, and relative to what baseline? Libertarians typically restrict themselves to considering material well-being relative to a baseline of persisting common unownership, and this allows the limits to be easily met. But both these restrictions are unacceptable. Libertarians, of all people, should recognize the importance of autonomy and independence to the well-lived life. But once these values are taken into account, it is not so clear that unilateral appropriations make no-one worse off, even compared to continued unownership.
Moreover, our comparisons should also take into account the alternative systems of appropriation that could have resulted instead – anything less amounts to an “arbitrary narrowing of the options”. Once these are considered, it seems most likely that disproportionate appropriations of natural resources will not be allowed, for they disadvantage excluded people relative to more egalitarian alternatives.
Suppose that continued unownership of a pasture would be so unproductive as to cause several locals to starve to death. Nozick thus allows an individual to appropriate the land for himself, employ the able-bodied locals, and leave the disabled or talentless to starve just as they would have before. But if the land were distributed equally, the less able could rent out use of their land in return for a share of the products. This way everyone would survive. Unilateral appropriation would lead some to starve who otherwise need not have – it is absurd to say that they are not harmed by this.
However, broadened consideration may prevent the proviso from ever being met, since there will always be an alternative that is better for someone. Thus we may need to abandon this approach to initial acquisition, and adopt some alternative such as utilitarian or egalitarian shares instead.
But these too become problematic once the rights of future generations are taken into account. Their inclusion would require natural resources to be divided into indefinitely many shares, precluding each individual from receiving any. Yet it seems unjust to exclude newcomers from initial acquisition, so this may necessitate periodic compensatory redistribution.
Further, an absolute property right entitles the owner to dispose of their property however they wish – even destroying it, if they so desire. But surely it would be a gross injustice for the present generation to destroy the world’s natural resources. So we must not have any such absolute right after all.
Thus we find that, if utilitarianism neglects the past, libertarianism is mired in it. Entitlement theory suffers from a lack of foresight. Absolute property rights are not responsive to people’s changing needs, so – insofar as we hold that justice ought to be – we must reject absolute entitlements, replacing them with a more flexible system which allows for re-allocation in response to newcomers to the system and the changing needs of those within it.
Nozick objects to this sort of reasoning. “To use a person [for another’s benefit] does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice”. But this is foolishness. No-one is claiming that the demanded sacrifice is for his own good. Rather, it is to benefit someone else in greater need, another person for whom theirs is the only life they have. Nozick's egoistic objection is thus patently question-begging.
Further criticisms might derive from a belief that interpersonal welfare is incommensurable. But that is not plausible. If I get a paper-cut and you get beheaded, it is absurd to deny that you have suffered a greater harm. And it is similarly absurd to deny the moral counterpart, that it is more important to save your head than my finger. The utilitarian may grant that saving your head will not compensate me for my paper-cut, but it can still be of greater moral weight.
Libertarians hold that each person owns themselves, and others may not make use of their property (i.e. them) without their consent. Just as others have no right to shelter a homeless man in my house, so they have no right to tax the products of my labour and redistribute to the needy. But the free market requires ownership rights over both self and external resources, and we have seen that the latter is problematic. Moreover, self-ownership is a merely ‘formal’ notion that does not guarantee substantive freedom or power over one’s own life. For suppose that natural resources are initially owned by everyone rather than no-one. On this view, a self-owning individual may not make use of the material world without others’ consent. But, as Kymlicka asks, “how can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others?” Such merely formal freedom has no worth. Yet this is the position of the poor and disadvantaged within a libertarian capitalist society.
Once we recognize the importance of substantive rather than merely formal freedom, our aim becomes to enable people to live the lives they want to live. This commits us to ensuring access to education, health-care, and basic human needs like food and shelter, since all of these are essential prerequisites to any form of freedom worth having. If provision of these goods requires us to compromise self-ownership, so be it.
Utilitarians deny that there are any independent facts about ‘fair shares’ or ‘just deserts’ prior to the utility calculations which give equal weight to the interests of all. But if we find this response implausible, we may feel some pressure to reform the theory so as to take justice as prior to – and part of – the utility calculations, rather than a consequence thereof. However, this would yield a just theory of utilitarianism, rather than a utilitarian theory of justice. We would thus require some independent account of justice. We have seen that the libertarian ‘entitlement theory’ is not a plausible candidate. Although the principle of transfer enjoys much intuitive appeal, it cannot get off the ground without a principle of initial acquisition, and the problems there appear to be insurmountable.
Libertarianism ignores the future; utilitarianism, the past. Perhaps what we need is a theory of justice that looks both ways before trafficking in the present.
Two diametrically opposed theories of Justice: Libertarian and Utilitarian, demonstrate the stark difference between individual and communal justice. Cooperation vs. Competition is a mistake, it is not either/or, it's both, each in its own place for the appropriate time. Now the question is when and where to use each and why?
Let's start with cooperation, then compete.
No comments:
Post a Comment